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Abstract Digital ventures are entrepreneurial young firms
that introduce new digital artifacts that are ‘‘ever-incomplete’’ and ‘‘perpetually-in-the-making’’ onto the market.
The study examines how six digital ventures continued to
develop their digital market offerings post launch. Three
key designing mechanisms are identified that explain
continuous post-launch product development in digital
ventures: deploying complementary digital objects, architectural amplification, and porting. The study discusses
how these mechanisms advance our understanding of how
digital technologies change entrepreneurial processes and
outcomes.
Keywords Digital entrepreneurship  Digital innovation 
Product development  Late-stage entrepreneurship  Case
study  Digital artifacts

1 Introduction
A growing number of entrepreneurial ventures—professionally-funded and privately-owned young firms (Garg
and Eisenhardt 2017)—create digital market offerings, that
is, new products and services that are embodied in
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information and communication technologies or enabled
by them (von Briel et al. 2018b). Firms such as Google,
Facebook, and Tencent, now household names with considerable influence on the world’s economy, all started as
digital ventures (Autio et al. 2018; Nambisan 2017), and
new digital market offerings brought to the market by
digital ventures are now featuring in a wide array of sectors
(Autio et al. 2018; Nambisan 2017), from online dating
(Davidson and Vaast 2010), to biotechnology (Rothe et al.
2019), IT hardware (von Briel et al. 2018a), and financial
services (Gomber et al. 2018; Huang et al. 2017; Kazan
et al. 2018).
The material properties of digital market offerings distinguish them from traditional market offerings: they are—
at least in theory—inherently malleable (Kallinikos et al.
2013; Yoo et al. 2010), because digital technology is
reprogrammable, distributable, and thus generative (Yoo
et al. 2010; Zittrain 2008). In consequence, digital market
offerings are themselves ever-incomplete and perpetuallyin-the-making (Faulkner and Runde 2019; Garud et al.
2008), presenting digital ventures with a key challenge:
how should they develop their products not only at the
beginning but throughout the venture, from initiation to
launch and post-launch?
This question has not been sufficiently addressed in the
emerging digital entrepreneurship literature (Von Briel
et al. 2021). While this literature recognizes that digital
technology influences entrepreneurial ventures in various
ways (Huang et al. 2021; Nambisan 2017), it has primarily
focused on digital technologies as enablers of new venturing activity (Autio et al. 2018; von Briel et al. 2018a) or
as a means to accommodate the challenges that accompany
organizational growth (Huang et al. 2017; Tumbas et al.
2017a). For example, past research asserts that digital
technologies, such as miniaturized hardware platforms,
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open-source software, or peer-to-peer lending, can enable
the proliferation of digital ventures in specific sectors, like
IT hardware (von Briel et al. 2018a), or new ecosystems
(Autio and Cao 2019; Nambisan et al. 2019). While authors
such as Nambisan (2017, p. 1030) have noted that ‘‘the
scope, features, and value of offerings would continue to
evolve even after they [products and services] have been
introduced to the market’’, there is little systematic
knowledge about how digital ventures actually engage in
product development after launch. This is problematic,
because the time following the initial launch of a product is
when digital ventures are traditionally hit by the ‘‘valley of
death’’ (Barr et al. 2009, p. 371) as progress and growth
become increasingly costly and difficult (Tumbas et al.
2017b).
This gap in understanding presents a theoretical problem: the literature seems to build on the tacit assumption
that new ventures transform into established organizations
after the successful creation and commercialization of an
initial, novel digital offering (Davidsson 2015; Nambisan
2017). This assumption, however, is at odds with the
understanding that digital technologies are equipped with
ambivalent ontologies, meaning that form, function, or
purpose of digital artifacts can change at any point (Kallinikos et al. 2013). And indeed, in practice, digital ventures seldom build sustained success on the singular
development and launch of a digital market offering
(Nambisan 2017). Instead, most digital ventures enter the
market with inherently unfinished products (McDonald and
Eisenhardt 2020), often referred to as a minimum viable
product (MVP) (Ries 2011). An example is Dropbox,
whose MVP was just a video explaining the idea along
with a sign-up function, and also the first iPhone, which
lacked basic functionality to copy and paste text (let alone
pictures and other files) or handle MMS. Moreover,
examples such as Uber’s expansion from its match-making
offering into areas such as food delivery or bicycle-sharing
also illustrate that digital ventures continue to extend and
expand beyond their initial market entry (Huang et al.
2021).
As such, when digital ventures initially launch a new
product, they need to evaluate and revise once-made
assumptions about the design of their products, for instance
in the light of customer feedback, with often wide-ranging
implications for the functionalities included in the product,
as well as establish organizational structures that permit the
future growth of the organization. Our aim is thus to
unpack how digital ventures continue to develop their
products post launch, to better understand how they navigate this challenge. To do so, we use an inductive multiplecase analysis of six digital ventures in the German RhineMain startup ecosystem, to study whether, how, and why
digital offerings by these ventures evolved post-launch.
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Grounded in the data, we develop a model of three theoretical mechanisms (deploying complementary digital
objects, architectural amplification, and porting) that
describe how digital ventures continuously develop their
digital offerings post launch.
We contribute to the literature in three important ways.
First, we show that the unique properties of digital offerings continually emerge and evolve through deliberate acts
of designing. Second, we demonstrate that digital
entrepreneurship is characterized by continuous product
development, even after the launch of a digital offering.
Third, we connect two largely disjoint streams of literature
that relate to the digital entrepreneurship discourse: studies
on new product development, and new venture growth.
We start by reviewing research on product development
in digital ventures and elaborate why product development
is never quite finished. We then describe our research
design and then present our case analysis and interpretation. Finally, we discuss the implications that follow from
our study.

2 Background
The fundamental idea that digital technologies—man-made
artifacts that are made up of layers of material (e.g., hard
disks, monitors, smartphones) and nonmaterial (e.g., software, files, binary strings of 0’s and 1’s) objects and
bearers (Faulkner and Runde 2009, 2019)—have the
potential to shape and even upend traditional ways of
organizing is fairly established by now (Baskerville et al.
2020; Nambisan et al. 2017; Yoo et al. 2010, 2012). The
starting point for the pivotal influence of digital technologies is rooted in advances in software (including microcode, firmware, software, content, and quantum instruction
sets) and hardware (including microprocessors, memory,
power management, sensors, and new materials), which
have opened up opportunities to add new functionalities
and capabilities to traditional economic goods (Yoo 2010).
Several streams of research have begun to explore
specifically how digital ventures leverage these properties
to develop new products. One stream investigates how
digital ventures conceive of and pursue new digital venture
ideas (von Briel et al. 2018b). Here, a key insight is that
digital technology plays a crucial role in enabling different
key tasks in the pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunities
(von Briel et al. 2018a). For instance, standardized electronic development platforms (think Arduino mega) allow
digital ventures to quickly assemble prototypes of new
products like drones (e.g., 3D Robotics), smartwatches
(e.g., Pebble), and 3D printers (e.g., Makerbot and
RepRap). Similarly, publicly available tools, open-source
software repositories, and SaaS solutions aid digital
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ventures efforts in the fast development of individual
product features. For instance, Spotify, rather than building
a new technology from scratch, relied on Google’s TensorFlow platform to develop a recommender system for its
streaming service.
Collectively, these developments support the assertion
that product development in digital ventures unfolds in an
increasingly non-linear and unbounded fashion. Digital
technology’s inherent capacity for both planned and
unprompted change (Zittrain 2008) drastically reduces the
time and effort that is required to conceive and assemble
new products. As a consequence, researchers look to better
understanding how digital ventures can effectively leverage these opportunities afforded by digital technology.
In this context, primarily practitioner-oriented concepts
such as pivots, MVPs, and business models have gained
currency among researchers (Kirtley and O’Mahony 2020;
McDonald and Gao 2019; McGinn 2012; Ries 2011) to
explain how digital ventures develop new products. A key
assumption underlying this line of research is that because
they heavily draw upon digital technology, digital ventures
experience unprecedented levels of flexibility. The possibility to decouple and recombine functional logic from
material bearers together with the capability to compute
functionality in runtime render digital technologies inherently malleable (Faulkner and Runde 2019; Kallinikos
et al. 2013). Malleability fundamentally differentiates
digital technology from traditional technology: it allows
them to be context specific and to evolve continuously and
thus, to adapt to individual users and use cases (Huang
et al. 2021; Yoo 2010). Consequently, product development in digital ventures carries the potential to be emergent, fluid, and dynamic, allowing digital ventures to
continuously evolve their market offerings in their quest to
establish a viable business (not least because competitors,
too, can rapidly form and enact product ideas); digital
ventures can easily adjust their business model, target
customers, and organizational structures in case they run
into a dead end.
Collectively, the existing work offers several useful
contributions to our understanding of product development
in digital ventures. Researchers emphasize that digital
ventures’ inherent flexibility allows them to readily pursue
new opportunities at minimal costs (von Briel et al. 2018a;
Huang et al. 2021). Accordingly, it is no surprise that
researchers have focused on how digital ventures identify,
and subsequently develop new, often their first, products.
However, despite these valuable insights, past work leaves
unexplored how digital ventures continue to develop their
market offerings once they enter the market.
Exploring this question is important for at least two
reasons. First, it is widely accepted that when digital ventures enter the market, they seek to evaluate assumptions
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made during the initial design of the offering. Digital
ventures typically enter the market with a MVP, which by
definition is an unfinished product. Product development in
digital ventures, thus does not stop with introducing a new
product to the market (Garud et al. 2008). As they revise
initial assumptions, digital ventures typically adapt their
products as well. Specifically, digital ventures are equipped
with a variety of options to further extend and evolve the
properties and functionalities of their product in response
to novel insights that emerge as they begin to transact with
customers and complementors (Sambamurthy et al. 2003;
Woodard et al. 2013). For instance, the firm behind the
TiVo DVR eventually sought endorsement from relevant
market incumbents when faced with adversarial reactions
(Ansari et al. 2016), which also had implications for the
design of its DVR.
Second, the initial introduction of a market offering
marks a turning point for digital ventures: their focus shifts
from developing to marketing and selling their product
(Wu et al. 2008). This typically means that digital ventures
establish more formalized organizational structures that
allow for the commercialization of their product, ranging
from the formation of new departments, to the formalization of business processes, and hiring of new employees.
These organizational changes pose additional challenges to
digital ventures as they demand resources that can no
longer be vested in continued product development yet are
necessary to secure the continued existence of the venture.
Taken together, digital ventures face a key tension upon
the introduction of their first product. On the one hand
digital ventures need to implement organizational changes
that permit growing their user base, such as establishing
sales and marketing departments, hiring new employees,
and reallocating resources. These actions typically require
a more or less complete product so that the focus can shift
to exploiting (Bakker and Shepherd 2017). On the other
hand, digital ventures also need to adapt their offering to
accommodate emerging and changing customer demands,
address unforeseen incompatibilities, and manage technical
debt. Yet, exactly how digital ventures navigate this situation and what they do with their market offering, in particular, remains unknown at this point. We address this
blind spot in the literature through an inductive study of six
digital ventures.

3 Method
3.1 Design and Sampling
We engaged in a form of grounded theorizing (Gioia et al.
2013; Strauss and Corbin 1998), drawing on from a multicase study of six digital ventures (Eisenhardt 1989; Locke
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2007). Our objective was to examine how the ventures
evolved their digital offerings after their launch to create
viable businesses. Our research design aimed at generating
novel theoretical interpretations across theoretically replicated cases because this allowed us to develop theory that
is better grounded in varied empirical evidence, more
accurately defined from multiple cases, and more generalizable (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007; Yin 2009). We
tried to collect data as representative facts (Sarker et al.
2018), and our analysis strategy was inductive drawing
primarily on the Gioia methodology (Gioia et al. 2013).
The theory of mechanisms (e.g., Gross 2009) served as a
sensitizing ‘‘lens’’ to support the iterative process between
data collection and analysis (Eisenhardt 1989).
Our sampling strategy focused on four aspects. First,
timing since initial offering launch: it was important for our
study that the sampled ventures were in their post-launch
phase and that our cases varied in how long they had been
in this phase. By varying how long the sampled ventures
were in the post-launch phase, we sought to obtain insights
that were representative of digital ventures’ post-launch
phase and not just specific periods. The oldest of the ventures we sampled was active for several years when we
began our research, while the youngest had only just
launched its offering. Second, the nature of the digital
offering of the emergent ventures. The constitution of a
digital market offering can range from being primarily
software-based (think Whatsapp), i.e., with an ephemeral
embodiment, to being primarily hardware-based (think
Oculus Rift), i.e., with a perpetual embodiment (von Briel
et al. 2018b) We sampled ventures that had primarily
ephemeral digital offerings, to investigate how they drew
on digital technology’s unique properties to evolve their
offerings. This was important because ephemeral digital
offerings can draw more fully on digital artifacts’ capacity
for malleability, change, and evolution without being
restricted by the rigidity of physical object characteristics
(e.g., size, form, length, or weight of a plastic or metal
component). Our third sampling criterion was continued
existence. We only sampled ventures that remained operative and independent at the time of writing. We applied
this criterion to ensure the selected ventures pursued their
own agendas (as opposed to acquired ventures), and to
understand which behaviors may be associated with
effectively navigating the tension (as opposed to failure).
Fourth, we sampled ventures that were located in the same
geographical area to ensure they operated under similar
conditions. We initially identified ten ventures that were
willing to participate in our study. After pilot interviews
with each venture, we selected six of those ventures. We
excluded two ventures because they reported that their
product had not evolved since launch. Another two ventures were unable to participate due to time-constraints. We
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continued with the six cases and felt, with time, that they
presented rich compelling evidence, a sharp focus on our
unit of analysis, continued development of digital offerings, and comparability as well as between-case variance
(Eisenhardt and Ott 2017).
3.2 Data Collection
Data collection took place between July 2018 and
September 2019. The sampled ventures were on average
four years and eight months old and had between 3 and 130
employees. Our unit of analysis were the ventures and the
acts through which they continued to develop their offerings post-launch. As is common in digital entrepreneurship
research (e.g., Huang et al. 2017, 2021), we collected data
using multiple methods covering primary and secondary data, from both formal and informal sources
(Table 1).
First, we conducted eleven semi-structured formal
interviews and twelve informal interviews with co-founders and employees of the case organizations. Formal
interviews were held in German and later professionally
transcribed to English. They relied on a set of preplanned
questions (see Appendix) but remained open towards
emerging themes. Interviewing proceeded in through
multiple rounds. Initially, we focused on three key areas:
(1) how and why was the venture founded; (2) how did the
venture evolve over time; and (3) how did the ventures
change, alter, or otherwise adjust their digital offerings post
launch and why. At that stage, our goal was to establish a
contextually sensitive account of why the ventures were
formed, why the initial product had the type and form it
had and why and how the ventures made decisions about
the offering and how it could change. The interviews
yielded rich insights about sequence through which the
ventures had evolved their offerings post launch, focusing
on such aspects as what were triggers for changes to the
product (e.g., a collaboration with an incumbent, novel
insights about user behavior, actions by competitors), what
were changes to the product, and what was the outcome of
these changes. After initial data analysis (which also
included archival data), when our focus on the mechanisms
underlying post-launch digital product innovation concretized, we returned to the case organizations for a second
round of interviews where possible, this time to probe more
specifically the emergent concepts (mechanisms) that
unfolded through our inductive analysis. Formal interviews
lasted between 35 and 90 min (average 53 min), were
audio recorded and resulted in 207 pages of transcribed
interviews. Informal interviews took place as one-on-one
conversations during case visits and communal meetings,
did not follow a specific protocol, and relied on note taking
and memos instead of recording. These informal interviews
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Table 1 Case overview
Case code
name

ContentBlock

ScanFeet

RemoteService

EventPromo

TowCar

ContactUpdate

Founding
year

2011

2014

2015

2016

2016

2017

Founding
Context

The browser
extension had
existed for several
years prior to
founding the
company. The lead
developer was
approached by the
future CEO of the
company with an
idea on how to
monetize it the
software

The founder had
experience in the
shoe and apparel
industry and
realized that today’s
shoes were built
with lasts that did
not represent the
population

Prior to founding
RemoteService, the
founder had founded
a venture that
designed wind
turbines. Here, he
noticed the
difficulties with
servicing turbines in
the field

The founders
were festival
organizers, and
came up with
idea in response
to difficulties in
marketing and
selling tickets

One of the founders
had his own
workshop and thus
knew about the
industry structure.
He saw an
opportunity for a
low-cost, fast
alternative to
established services

The founders
noted after they
graduated
university, that
they lost track of
many fellow
students and thus
came up with the
idea

Scope

Global leader

National reach

National reach

International reach

International reach

Regional reach

Description

Upon founding,
ContentBlock
adapted the
content-blocking
functionality to
release, among
others, several
apps, a browser.
ContentBlock
coopted several
publishers to set up
a program for
whitelisting, which
made exempt some
forms of content
from content
blocking. Recently,
ContentBlock
sought to make
content-blocking
more widely
available, such that
the core
functionality would
be used by IT
administrators and
as part of other
products

A key ambition
was to increase
scan accuracy and
avoid that people
would be
recommended
shoes that did not
fit them. As such,
ScanFeet began to
support a larger
variety of scan
solutions and asked
for feedback from
customers. Lately,
ScanFeet made
available their scan
algorithm to third
parties. Expanded
the solution to
other clothing
items

RemoteService was
driven to better
understand how
they could enhance
remote support
teams, and learned
that storing and
making accessible
knowledge played
a key role in realtime field support.
As such,
RemoteService
catered its solution
to a variety of
machines and
industries and
introduced
additional
functionality for
storing and making
available
knowledge

Upon launch,
EventPromo
adapted the
offering to also
promote consumer
products and other
services via microinfluencers.
Released an API so
third parties could
easily integrate the
functionality into
their own products.
Tokenized the
promotion of these
objects and
conducted an ICO

Created a whitelabel version of the
platform that car
rentals and other
companies could
use. Collaborated
with automotive
suppliers to
develop an
integrated service
system around
towing

Pivoted from
maintaining
personal contacts
to a b2b solution
that ensured
customer data is up
to date. Integrated
a variety of
applications that
were widely used
by potential
customers.
Designed API so
companies could
check if (some part
of) their data was
outdated

Industry

Online
advertising
(b2b2c)

Apparel (b2b)

Manufacturing (b2b)

Online marketing (b2b2c)

Automotive
(b2b2c)

Cloud computing
(b2b)

Digital
Market
Offering

Open-source
browser
extension for
contentfiltering and ad
blocking

A solution for
3d scanning
feet in order
to find bestfitting shoes

A solution for secure
and reliable
communication for
remote servicing of
industrial machines and
equipment

Peer to peer marketing
solution through which brands
can engage fans to promote
services (e.g., apparel, events)
in exchange for rewards

Matching
platform for
broken down
cars with road
assistance
services

Digital platform for
contact
management to
keep contact
information always
up to date
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Table 1 continued
Revenue
Model

Charge advertisers
for being whitelisted

SaaS

SaaS

SaaS

Fee per
transaction

SaaS

Data
sources

3 formal interviews
and 4 informal
interviews (held in
Sept.’18, Aug. ‘19,
Sept. ‘19, w/CEO,
CTO, and cofounder), company
blog posts (12),
software release
notes

2 formal interviews,
4 informal
interviews (held
Aug.–Sept. ‘18 and
Sept. ‘19 w/CEO,
head of
development),
video and audio
material
(documentary,
interviews, pitches),
company blog

2 formal
interviews (held
in July’18 and
Aug’19 with
CEO), company
blog, video
material (2
pitches, 1 panel
discussion)

2 formal interviews
(held in June’18 and
Aug.’19 w/CEO),
Secondary
interviews, terms
and conditions,
social media posts,
ICO whitepaper

1 formal
interview, 3
informal
interviews (held
in Aug.’18 and
Oct. ‘18 with
CEO), company
blog posts,
industry press

1 formal interview, 1
informal interview
(held in Aug. and
Sept.’18 w/cofounder & CTO),
social media posts
(Facebook and
Twitter), video
material (pitches,
roundtables)

provided valuable insights into recent developments (e.g.,
pending release of new features, status of customer negotiations, hiring plans). They ranged between 21 and 37 min
in length.
Second, we complemented this data with archival data
on the case organizations to support our theorizing. We felt
these additional data sources were important to inform
ourselves on further developments that remained unaddressed by our interviews. For instance, many ventures
announced new offering features on their company blogs,
or through digital channels such as Medium, Twitter or
Facebook. These sources thus helped us to complement and
enrich the primary data collected through interviews and
observation. Overall, we collected company blogs, press
releases, published interviews, release notes, audio and
video material (e.g., pitches, roundtable discussions, terms
and conditions, industry reports), and social media data,
oftentimes covering the ventures’ entire lifecycle. This
added another 65 pages of written material, and approximately 58 min of audiovisual material.
Third, we also drew on communal, informal sources of
data (Alvesson and Kärreman 2007; Fiske 2004): we regularly attended start-up events (e.g., pitch events, startup
fairs, hackathons) to engage in discussions with the founders and to inform ourselves on recent sectoral and technological developments. This was important for us to
understand potential sectoral or technological antecedents
that might instill ventures to adjust their digital offering
development. A second reason was snowballing: by
attending the same communal forums, we got to know
several additional digital venture founders and their business models. The talks and discussions we held served as
additional informal data sources and provided us a richer
view of the context in which the sampled ventures
operated.
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3.3 Data Analysis
Our data analysis aimed at building explanatory theory
about continuous product development in digital ventures.
We consequently focused on developing explanations for
the unfolding of specific events that characterized product
development at the six ventures. To ensure quality in our
data-centric, inductive theory building (Sarker et al. 2018),
we followed extant guidelines for grounded theorizing
(Charmaz 2006; Strauss and Corbin 1994; Urquhart et al.
2010): we constantly compared data with emerging concepts and ensured tight linkages between the data and our
conceptualizations thereof. Examples of constant comparison are provided in in Fig. 1 and Table 2. We engaged in
theoretical sampling both in our iterative selection of cases
based on our specified criteria (e.g., by dropping non-informative cases) and in our data collection within cases
(e.g., through follow-up interviews after initial coding
rounds). We developed our emerging theoretical model in
iterative steps (see Fig. 1), using the Gioia methodology to
maintain rigor in conceptualization and scaling (see
Table 2).
Our overall analysis process is illustrated with examples
in Fig. 1. Broadly, we followed the approach suggested by
Gioia et al. (2013), that is, we built a data structure
(Table 2) that included the open empirical codes we
identified from the raw data and then summarized these in
the form of 2nd order theoretical categories. The results
from the 1st and 2nd order analyses then served as the basis
for generating our main (3rd order) theoretical concepts,
drawing on the notion of mechanism (e.g., Gross 2009) as
an analytical lens (Strauss and Corbin 1998). We proceeded in five main steps:
First, we started with within-case analysis (Miles et al.
2014) and wrote structured case narratives (Table 1) to gain

Identify design events for each venture.

Develop white label app for retailers and brands to
offer foot measuring functionality

Release build tools (e.g. libraries, APIs) to ease
usage of content blocking functionality

Release of administration tools to deploy core
offering in administered environments

Launch white label b2b solution for
mobility providers

Expand scope to support servicing of numerous
industrial machines

Develop plugins to integrate third-party
software (e.g., popular CRM systems)

Integrate into other offerings (e.g., app marketplaces
for ticketing services)

Repurpose offering from events only to also
promote products

Leverage complementary third-party services

Create dedicated interface for ticketing providers

Refactor source code

Pivot from providing smart glass applications to
providing secure communication platform

Develop MS Excel plugin to connect with
non-digital customers

Integrate with leading browser provider

Reposition offering as a technology solution provider
for foot data

Support different scan solutions, including mobile
scan solutions (e.g. with iPhone X)

1st Order Open Codes: Design Events

Fig. 1 Illustration of coding process

Key analysis
step

We created a playground to develop a better understanding of what fitting actually means. Because every individual has
different preferences and perceptions of what fits. Some folks like it much tighter, others prefer if it is loose, even when
their feet are essentially the same. So for instance, we asked customers to send us their favourite shoe, so we could

Of course we want to get into all browsers, and of course not every browser has extensions, and then we have to have
libraries and processes in principle so that they can simply pack AdBlocking into their stuff. And in the meantime we have
our own small team that does exactly these distribution partnerships for us. (ContentBlock)

We then developed a b2b solution for for instance car rental companies. They have breakdowns every day. They now can
to use our network, our system as a white label solution. Everything is possible. Then there is a one-time fee for provision,
adaptation, and customizing. And beyond that, there is a monthly license. Or a flat rate per order, which means that
everything is included. The provision of the network, the IT, the apps and so on. (TowCar)

We have a use case everywhere where complex equipment is maintained as complex assets in our service language. On the
sales side, we have focused on construction and agricultural machinery. That is a sub-segment of mechanical engineering.
But basically we are open to everything that concerns mechanical and plant engineering, from medical scales to determine
the weight of babies, for example, to sensor technology or sensory applications in the chemical park to combine
harvesters, we have everything in our customer portfolio, so to speak. (RemoteService)

We looked at SAP, Salesforce, Outlook, to understand how the interfaces, plug-ins work in the applications that people use
and where contact data is. But at the moment, no one knows us and will invest resources to really write an integration. We
may have to make these available. And then we also thought of another step, our own app to not only create access to the
platform, but we also build the platform by integrating into the first applications (ContactUpdate)

We approached ticketing providers and said: Look, we have a marketing solution for your promoters so that they sell more
. Yes, pitch that to them. And then when one of-. So if you then bring us a customer, so to
speak, then we even give you a cut of our revenue. Then they all said: Yeah, cool. And that's how we did the rollout. We
developed an API so they could use it. That is, we actually used this network effect in a very cool way and, similar to
itself, also helped ourselves to the business model of the people who already had a closer relationship with those
EventPromo)

We make heavy use of existing technologies via APIs. That means we dock onto the ticketing provider. We dock onto
Facebook. For example, we have SendGrid as a tool for e-mail communication. So when certain variables are met, certain
mail sequences are triggered. Or I can't think of the name of the tool right now. We also have the same thing, which is
actually like an automated messaging dispatch to WhatsApp and just via SMS, if I want that. So we ultimately have-. If you
think of it that way, our system is actually a complete pile of shit without all these other platforms because nothing works

We had a software dinosaur that somehow had to work. So it was all about stabilizing its operation. As soon as it was
stable, we began to refactor code. I modularized a lot, replaced a lot, and made it leaner and leaner. The system was huge.
It was built by freelancers. But you can also use standard software for a webshop, for example. You don't have to develop
from scratch. And we deliberately didn't add more traction because it wasn't a stable system (ScanFeet)

We moved away from video conferencing on smart glass to being a communication platform, i.e. integrating the entire
workflow into the platform. But ultimately we want to be a knowledge platform and doing so requires communication not
any specific technology, i.e. the main component, which is why we also call it communication, has always been the
exchange of information or the video conferences, i.e. communication. A knowledge database is ultimately a by-product of
this. But what we have now already included, but both because the data does not yet exist for the most part, and also
because it would simply represent a hurdle to integrate existing data via interfaces and the like, we are not focusing
primarily on the topic of the knowledge database. (RemoteService)

We would like to support 100 apps. But we probably only have resources for two and a half or so. And how can we solve
that? And that's now what we call light integration. I said, yeah, come on, they export that into Excel, give us the Excel, we
import that out through the system. And then they get an Excel with the updated data and import it (ContactUpdate)

So actually our approach here is to say: No, we take the Chrome browser and we build AdBlocking in and also we go to
partners. So we have big partners, also for example Microsoft is actually our most prominent partner with Edge, with a
ContentBlock)

We have realized that more and more scanning solutions are emerging in the market that can collect very good foot data
or very good data. Among other things, iPhone 10, which now has a very good camera. And that means the inputs are
getting higher and higher and better. That's why I can only recommend to get away from that, because our process behind
it was for other or is for other scanning solution than this one halt usable. We realized this last year because all the
scanning solutions approached us and said: "Can't we work together? Don't you want to use our solution? You can do
certain things that we can't." And we took advantage of that last year and made the decision that we had to change our

Raw Data
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Table 2 Data structure with mappings of 1st order design events to 3rd order mechanisms
Illustrative 1st order empirical codes (design events)

Case

2nd order theoretical
category

3rd order Mechanism

Launch initiative for whitelisting to evade blocking content

ContentBlock

Boundary Spanning

Deploying Complementary
Digital Objects

Create dedicated interface for ticketing providers

EventPromo

Boundary Spanning

Create substantial digital video material and tutorials

TowCar

Boundary Spanning

Support different scan solutions, including mobile scan solutions
(e.g., with iPhone X)

ScanFeet

Proactive Instilment

Integrate with leading browser provider

ContentBlock

Proactive Instilment

Pivot from providing smart glass applications to providing secure
communication platform

RemoteService

Proactive Instilment

Develop MS Excel plugin to connect with non-digital customers

ContactUpdate

Proactive Instilment

Integrate into other offerings (e.g., app marketplaces for ticketing
services)

EventPromo

Processual
Embedment

Develop plugins to integrate third-party software (e.g., popular
CRM systems)

ContactUpdate

Processual
Embedment

Release of ad-blocking mobile application for iOS and Android

ContentBlock

Processual
Embedment

Refactor source code

ScanFeet

Retrospective
Modularization

Release of stand-alone mobile browser

ContentBlock

Forking

Develop b2b version based on core algorithm
Reposition offering as a technology solution provider for foot data

ContactUpdate
ScanFeet

Forking
Forking

Expand scope to support servicing of numerous industrial machines

RemoteService

Forking

Repurpose offering from events only to also promote products

EventPromo

Forking

Develop white label app for retailers and brands to offer foot
measuring functionality

ScanFeet

Selected Interfacing

Release API to enable use of offering in third party services

TowCar

Selected Interfacing

Launch white label b2b solution for mobility providers

TowCar

Selected Interfacing

Release build tools (e.g., libraries, APIs) to ease usage of content
blocking functionality

ContentBlock

Selected Interfacing

a deep contextual understanding of each venture (Gioia
et al. 2013).
Second, using a temporal bracketing strategy (Langley
1999), we identified from the raw data for each venture the
sequence of salient design events, beginning from the
moment they first introduced their initial product to the
market, to understand how they continued to develop their
offerings post launch. We defined a design event as any
action or sequence of actions that was palpably related to
the development of a digital product as an artifact.
Examples include the launch or discontinuance of new
features, the revision of existing features, and the branching or forking of the core offering. By contrast, hiring new
employees or raising new funds did not qualify as design
events in that sense even though they were critical events
during the ventures’ trajectories. Figure 2 shows the
resulting timeline of salient design events by venture. This
step allowed us to develop a comprehensive account of
what the temporal and logical occurence of design events
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Architectural amplification

Porting

was through which the ventures evolved their products
(Miles et al. 2014), as a complement to our analysis of the
designing mechanisms that explain how the design events
contributed to the ongoing development of the digital
products.
Third, the sequence of design events then formed the
basis for cross-case analysis, as we shifted our attention
towards developing more abstract and general explanations
for why the design events took place and how they
unfolded. In so doing, we compared design events across
the six cases to gain understanding of what were the triggers and outcomes of these design events and to what
extent similarities or differences could be observed in the
design events salient for each event. To that end, we generated 2nd level theoretical categories that captured and
aggregated similarities experienced across the design
events for each venture. For instance, we noticed that some
design events targeted at adapting the product to enter
adjacent markets (e.g., adding functionality to promote any
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Fig. 2 Timeline of salient design events (light grey) and selected other important events (white), by venture

sort of service/good in the case of EventPromo), while
others revised the product architecture to ensure its longterm prosperity (e.g., ScanFeet did substantial refactoring,
thereby delaying the development of new features).

Elaborating these similarities and differences, we
advanced six 2nd order theoretical categories of design
events (Fig. 1) that captured what their main triggers and
outcomes were. For instance, we learned that some events
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aimed at integrating the products into the surrounding
socio-technical environment through the deliberate design
of complementary digital objects in response to potential
incompatibilities between the product and its environment
(boundary spanning), whereas others made core functionality available to third parties to broaden the scope of the
offering (selected interfacing).
Fourth, we then sought to cluster as well as to differentiate the categories to analyze what were the overarching
mechanisms that generated the observed events and categories. By comparing the categories to analyze if they cooccurred or were independent from each other, we identified three broad themes of product development prevalent
at the six ventures: (1) expanding the scope of a digital
product with new and revised features, (2) revising the
architecture of the digital product, which did not necessarily involve in the introduction of new features, and (3)
adapting the product to new use cases. Elaborating the
empirical characteristics of these themes, we derived three
theoretical mechanisms, namely deploying complementary
digital objects, architectural amplification, and porting. In
line with other mechanism-based theorizing (Henfridsson
and Yoo 2014; Huang et al. 2017), we use the term
mechanisms as analytical concept to capture the relationships between causes and effects (Gross 2009). That is, we
defined different mechanisms as explanations for the
unfolding of design events and how they contributed to the
development of the product (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010).
For each mechanism, we sought to understand from the
data the triggers (what are the circumstances when the
mechanism is enacted), the actions (what are the specific
activities performed by the ventures that underpin each
mechanism), and the outcomes (how does each mechanism
contribute to the development of the product), which we
aggregated within the label and definition in the mechanisms we propose.
In a fifth and final step, building on the temporal
bracketing of design events in step two, we then analyzed
the logical-temporal relationships between the mechanisms
and how they collectively contributed to continued product
development within the ventures. By comparing the
sequences of design events (and their conceptual aggregation into 2nd order categories) over time and across the
six ventures, we uncovered how the mechanisms sequentially conditioned one another (e.g., the outcome of one
mechanism triggered the enactment of another mechanism). For instance, we learned that adapting the product to
new use cases typically then required substantial revisions
to the product’s architecture. Similarly, the deployment of
digital objects then required the ventures to maintain a
close look at level of technical debt they accumulated, such
that it occasionally triggered architectural amplification.
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We captured these relationships in the form of six conceptual connections between our 3rd order mechanisms.
Table 2 summarizes our data structure and illustrates
how we arrived from the 1st order empirical codes (i.e.,
from design events encountered by each digital venture)
through summarization and abstraction to the three 3rd
order mechanism that explain how which digital ventures
evolved their digital products post launch: deploying
complementary digital objects (the mechanism by which
digital ventures deploy a collection of digital data, services,
and infrastructure to integrate their offering into its sociotechnical environment), architectural amplification (the
mechanism by which digital ventures leverage their offerings’ malleable and generative potential to facilitate
dynamically unfolding interactions between their offerings
and other actors), and porting (the mechanism by which
digital ventures isolate and then deploy core digital technology underlying their product to new use contexts in
order to pursue additional innovation trajectories). An
example is ScanFeet. ScanFeet initially engaged in
proactive instilment to expand the range of available scan
options. However, this also increased the level of technical
debt ScanFeet had to deal with, such that it triggered retrospective modularization. This modularization, in turn
created opportunities for them to white label the core
technology and make it available to third parties, thus
leading to selected interfacing.

4 Continuous Product Development in Digital Ventures
Upon the launch of their offering, all the ventures in our
study were aware that their entrepreneurial journey had not
yet concluded. Instead, the ventures were guided by a
broad vision of what they wanted to achieve with their
ventures and what they represented, and in that sense
viewed the launch of their offering as a means to an end
and intermediate step towards realizing their visions. For
example, ContentBlock had the vision of putting users in
charge of a fair web experience and devised a content
blocking software that could block ads and other content on
websites, yet encountered countless counter measures by
those affected (e.g., publishers) to circumvent the blockade. ContentBlock’s chairman referred to this dynamic as a
race that triggered several design decisions related to the
offering’s scope, how it is distributed, and accompanying
digital initiatives to materialize their vision.
As such, we found that the ventures knew they had to
continuously evolve their market offerings after launch.
Yet, we also discovered that their design visions evolved
over time: new goals emerged as the ventures launched
their offerings and learned what could be done with them.
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For example, the CEO of RemoteService reflected on the
how their digital offering evolved over time:
We evolved from a not really finished to a more finished to a supposedly finished product. So you still
can’t say it is finished because we still learn and
understand better what is necessary and what we
have to do differently, better and complete. We know
we are 90% on track, but that we are still questioning
what we can do better. […] And our MVP was an
educated guess of the product, which we thought our
customers would like to have and pay money for.
Very limited and definitely not finished. That’s how
we won first customers. […] But then of course we
realized that we have to dock a lot more. Supporting
service staff wherever they are at their machine to
solve problems. (CEO RemoteService)
As captured in the quote above, the ventures faced
substantial uncertainty in the time following the launch of
their offerings, seeking to establish themselves as viable
organizations. Our analysis yielded a number of recurring
patterns in how the ventures digital ventures dealt with this
uncertainty through continuous reenactment of their digital
offerings. We captured these patterns through three
mechanisms: deploying complementary digital objects,
architectural amplification, and porting. Collectively, these
mechanisms explain how the digital ventures we studied
evolved their market offerings over time.
4.1 Deploying Complementary Digital Objects
Following the launch of their digital offering, the six digital
ventures started to deploy dedicated digital objects (e.g.,
data, services, tools, and/or infrastructure) to integrate their
offering into the socio-technical environment for which it
was designed. Central to this deployment was the ventures’
realization that they were often much more advanced in
their use of digital technology than other stakeholders in
their environment, which imposed additional effort on
them to be able to create envisioned value within that
environment. Tapping domain-specific knowledge and
synchronizing existing structures through complementary
digital objects was thus key for the digital ventures to
create a viable business around their offerings once launched. To that end, the digital ventures made a clear distinction between complementors that digital ventures coopt
to implement their business idea) and users (consumers of
their offerings). They engaged each stakeholder type
through carefully designed digital objects that served to
embed their offering into the environment in which the
stakeholders operated. For example, the ventures we
studied oftentimes were aware that adoption of their
offering for both complementors and users posed a burden
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that could be lessened by building on available complementary digital objects, such as stablished digital infrastructures like mobile computing or web browsing. We refer
to this mechanism as deploying complementary digital
objects.
We found two distinct activities in which this mechanism manifested: boundary spanning and proactive instilment. Boundary spanning captures the activities by which
the digital ventures, through their use of complementary
digital objects, were able to engage and onboard complementors they required to materialize their business model.
Examples of such objects included video material and
tutorials, dedicated digital web apps) through which complementors could be on-boarded with minimal effort, or
digital infrastructures and tools (such as GPS and social
media) that established convenient workflows for complementors around the offering. These objects allowed complementors to actively partake in and benefit from the
entrepreneurial initiatives by the ventures. At the same
time, the ventures were able to demonstrate to complementors the value partaking would yield, without disrupting the complementors’ established organizational
structures. Deploying and using these digital objects was
crucial because they ensured compatibility between existing ways of working and the novel value proposition of the
ventures’ offering, thus spanning the boundaries between
the old and the new.
For instance, TowCar, with its digital offering that
readily connects individuals whose car broke down with
towing services, entered a largely non-digitalized industry,
where a large portion of business transactions were still
arranged via traditional channels such as telephone or fax
machines. It proved difficult for TowCar to onboard complementors (i.e., towing service providers), who oftentimes
only operated the most basic IT infrastructure and also
lacked required skills to readily adopt the digital service
offering. The CEO told us:
there are also towing services, they are just a bit-.
Let’s put it this way, it’s a craftsman’s business. And
accordingly, they are not economically trained or
thought. And some simply say: We’ve always done it
that way. (CEO TowCar)
TowCar deployed various complementary digital
objects to overcome these difficulties. While TowCar initially developed a dedicated mobile app for towing services
(‘partner app’), they abandoned further development of the
partner app because only very few complementors possessed and used mobile devices in their working environment to begin with. Further, installing the app proved
difficult for complementors because the app was not
available via app stores because one of the app’s core
features did not comply with app store review guidelines.
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TowCar ultimately focused on offering its services via web
browsers, thereby circumventing both of the aforementioned difficulties by leveraging existing and familiar digital infrastructure that yielded a better fit to the
complementors even if the technology was considered
outdated.
A second activity through which deploying complementary digital objects manifested was proactive instilment. Through proactive instillment, the digital ventures
sought to render their offering accessible to potential users,
that is, they attempted to deploy digital objects to remove
bottlenecks and barriers to adopting the offering. Proactive
instilment thus captures digital ventures’ activities aimed at
enabling user adoption through complementary digital
objects. To do so, the ventures scrutinized existing user
habits, to learn how they could integrate their offering into
user routines. For instance, rather than requiring users to
visit local scanning spots to scan their feet, ScanFeet
leveraged modern smartphones’ sophisticated cameras to
simplify the overall process for future users.
Complementary digital objects were key to proactive
instilment because the digital ventures could not know in
advance how exactly their offering will be appropriated by
users. As such, they deliberately exposed their offerings to
the environment and sought feedback about obstacles that
would hamper their adoption. They then addressed those
challenges through the design of digital objects that simplified the adoption. For instance, upon the launch of their
offering, RemoteService faced substantial difficulties
facilitating adoption of its secure, real-time communication
solution for remote support. To ease adoption,
RemoteService then released complementary digital tools
for logging the contents of the communication and
reporting to support user workflows. As the CEO told us:
Some customers used our tool in ways we didn’t even
aim for. So they formed workarounds using tool and
used our tool for processes that we didn’t even plan
to support. So documentation, inspection, quality
control, which we hadn’t planned for that at all. For
us it was always about solving problems on site as
quickly and easily as possible. And of course, feature
requests evolved from this. […] A very concrete
example: we never really wanted to support the
documentation of cases on mobile devices for technicians on site. But then we made something like this
possible, which completely destroyed the UX. And
yes, a certain uncontrolled growth has happened.
(CEO RemoteService)
Overall, the deployment of complementary digital
objects facilitated the integration of the ventures’ offerings
into the environment. However, it often also led to what
one CEO also referred to as featuritis: it created an
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architectural challenge because the core offering and features of a digital product had to connect also with a wealth
of complementary digital objects. This circumstance led
the ventures to renegotiate the architecture of their digital
market offerings. We detail this in the following
mechanism.
4.2 Architectural Amplification
A second mechanism we uncovered captures digital ventures’ actions by which they leverage their offerings’
malleability to expand the scope of the offering postlaunch, for instance by modifying the product architecture
such that it can integrate third-party offerings or expand to
include complementary, adjacent features. We refer to this
mechanism as architectural amplification.
The architectural amplification mechanism should be
comprehended in light of digital ventures’ awareness that
the initial launch of a digital offering merely represented a
means to an end, not an end in itself. As such, digital
ventures sought to enable their offerings to be enriched
with additional functionality. One way to do so was by
curating their offerings’ architecture and by integrating
(into) third-party offerings. Architectural amplification is
thus key to ensure digital ventures’ offering’s long-term
viability, fostering its role as a launchpad for future
entrepreneurial actions. From the data, we found this
mechanism to be constituted by two activities: retrospective modularization and processual embedment.
Retrospective modularization captures activities through
which digital ventures ensure that their offering exhibits
typical digital technology traits, such as modularity, malleability, and generativity, but only after an initial product
version was launched. This activity was central to secure
the ventures’ future prosperity, since the initially launched
offerings oftentimes exhibited a monolithic, integrated, and
inflexible digital architecture (rather than a modular, flexible digital architecture). An inflexible architecture was the
result of time and resource constraints typical for an early
market entry, and the ad-hoc decision making style that is
typical of early stages of entrepreneurship: during their
early days, the digital ventures focused on creating an
offering that worked (Ries 2011) and served to evaluate the
business idea, rather than creating a fully-fledged, coherent,
and modular digital offering. Specifically, the ventures we
studied experienced several unforeseen events that led
them to diverge from initial plans. Coping with these
changes often had wide-ranging implications for the market offerings and required them to adjust it. As a consequence, the digital ventures already had accumulated some
level of technical debt that posed a threat to the ventures’
flexibility. In response, many adopted modern, modular
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digital design paradigms to reestablish flexibility and
ensure the offering’s long-term viability.
To illustrate, consider ScanFeet’s efforts to refactor its
core offering after launch. The initial offering was originally developed by a group of contractors. While ScanFeet’s product backlog filled quickly with new feature
requests, they decided to stall their implementation and
instead shift attention to refactoring the offering’s monolithic digital architecture. As the head of development
noted:
The system had grown historically. I know how difficult it is to learn your way around existing code.
And the time wasted on this could have been put into
developing new features. […] And the application
was way too big. A huge monolith, which didn’t run
stable at all. That’s why I didn’t pull any traction on
it. […] We first had to make sure that the infrastructure worked, because nothing was there! […] We
switched rigorously to standard software, and where
we had to customize, those parts we developed ourselves. And I used a lot of APIs to handle sensitive
things like checkout [in online shops]. And that really
wasn’t easy. [But] we wanted to scale, which meant
that we also had to get the data clean. […] And I’ve
always been under a lot of pressure to bring new
features out, but we needed the infrastructure in
place first. […] And we had an internal project in
which we increasingly modularized the entire code.
Because contractors brought in a lot of redundancy.
And we modularized it very rigorously, such that we
would have a set of highly modular building blocks.
(CEO ScanFeet)
Processual embedment captures the activities by which
digital ventures sought to complement their digital offerings by enabling it to fit into a broader variety of different
business processes. Processual embedment requires a deep
understanding of the environment in which offerings were
meant to be situated in. The ventures viewed their offerings
not in isolation but as existing within a larger digital value
landscape. As such, the ventures took actions that ensured
their offerings could entertain manifold connections to, and
interactions with a variety of digital services (e.g., third
party services), and subsequently integrated (into) third
party digital services that were complementary to their
offering. In so doing, the ventures deliberately leveraged
their offerings’ malleability to devise processual routines
that implicated their offerings. These routines were created
by integrating third party services via standardized interfaces and procedure calls, in which their offering could
assume an integral role. In turn these actions increased the
value their offering delivered to immediately.
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For example, ContactUpdate enabled the creation of
user workflows around its core offering by identifying
potential digital touchpoints that users could have with
other complementary services while using ContactUpdate’s
offering. To that end, ContactUpdate manually wrote
integration scripts in the form of software plug-ins for
common CRM software, such that users could also access
complementary CRM functionality while using ContactUpdate. As one of the co-founders noted:
We will offer CRM-like functionalities for smaller
companies via the web. However, we don’t want to be
a CRM. […] So it’s better for us to use third party
services. Either, we’ll integrate with Zoho. Such that
we can simply integrate a CRM in the background,
without letting customers know, without them having
to log into a separate system or even realizing that we
use a separate system. We just want access and
integrate some CRM features. And then we upload it
from our system into this CRM. And then we simply
set CRM campaigns. And we always ask ourselves
whether we should program such features ourselves?
At the moment, we have. But if we now need reminder
and tracking possibilities, to determine who clicked
on the links we sent, can’t we perhaps somehow do
this via a CRM campaign, because these systems
already come with such a functionality? Or is there a
way in the configurations of CRM systems, because
they allow us to define the workflows so that we don’t
have to program these functionalities. So, how can we
possibly just access and tie together different elements or parts of our flow and integrate them via
different interfaces? (CTO ContactUpdate)
Processual embedment not only allowed the ventures to
increase their offering’s value creation potential without
having to invest resources in developing new features, but
also ensured the ventures remained flexible and independent. Processual embedment occurred in an ad-hoc manner
and usually did not involve a long-term commitment on the
side of the digital venture: The digital ventures did not
prescribe and demarcate specific use cases for their offerings. They merely ensured their offerings’ compatibility
and compliance with dominant technological standards,
such that it could interact with diverse digital resources and
be implemented in common digital business processes by
third-party providers. Yet, these temporary assemblages
could be resolved once obsolete, thereby minimizing the
entrepreneurial risk associated with such actions. As such,
their digital offerings’ ability to be modified and reenacted
with comparably little effort and the venture’ increasing
mastery thereof, enabled expansion of the digital market
offering and offering beyond its initial scope, which we
detail in the following mechanism.
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4.3 Porting
The third mechanism we uncovered portrays how digital
ventures put core digital technology to new use contexts in
order to pursue additional innovation trajectories. We refer
to this mechanism as porting. Porting represented an
important means for ventures to advance their entrepreneurial initiative post launch beyond their initial ambitions.
Porting should be comprehended in light of the competitive dynamics that are typical of digital fields, where
competitors (e.g., incumbent organizations or other ventures) can easily copy features once they are released. The
digital ventures we studied closely monitored the progress
they made with their venturing efforts, and simultaneously
searched for additional opportunities to leverage their
digital offering’s self-referential, distributable nature.
Realizing the constant threat posed by uncertain market
conditions and strategic moves of competitors, porting
allowed digital ventures to increase their reach and
strengthen their market position, while reducing the risk
falling prey to copycats offering similar offerings. Yet,
porting in itself also represented a challenging endeavor,
since it required the ventures to invest often scarce
resources. Digital ventures navigated this tension by
skillfully drawing on already existing digital technology.
We found at least two activities supporting the porting
mechanism: forking and selected interfacing.
Forking captures activities through which digital ventures used digital technology that was core to their offerings to pursue additional innovation trajectories that were a
variant of the original digital venture idea. Oftentimes,
such additional opportunities were discovered in adjacent
markets that the ventures had not planned to enter. For
instance, opportunities emerged because users made the
ventures aware of an added value or expressed the desire to
have a similar service but in a different market. In response
to such realizations, digital ventures had to make a decision
on whether to pursue additional innovation trajectories,
while confronting substantial uncertainty and resource
constraints.
When pursuing forking, we found that the digital ventures leveraged the knowledge they acquired previously to
streamline the launch of additional products. The ventures
probed ways to materialize new innovation trajectories by
analyzing new contextual conditions in which the offering
was to function. Thereby the digital ventures accommodated new use contexts in their digital offerings. They did
so by distinguishing and isolating core features from the
contextual features. As a result, digital ventures were able
to swiftly recondition core digital technology to new use
contexts, where a new context was reflected in a set of
additional features to complement and contextualize the
core.
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For instance, RemoteService’s core digital technology is
a digital platform for secure and reliable communication
between locally dispersed individuals to support and
improve servicing of complex industrial machines. Once
RemoteService had mastered technological details to
ensure these qualities (e.g., secure and reliable communication and subsequent documentation), as well as details of
onboarding users through the use of digital resources (e.g.,
video material, and related workflows), they were able to
streamline these activities when tapping into new contexts
where these qualities were equally important. More
specifically, RemoteService’s original use context was
servicing large and complex land machines. However, soon
they realized how other contexts similarly depended on and
would benefit from secure and reliable communication,
such as servicing medical equipment containing sensitive
data. In response to this, RemoteService created a digital
platform that ensured these properties, while separating and
clustering context-specific functionalities (such as support
for proprietary devices) that could be patched in on premise
and maintained mostly independently from the core. More
specifically, consider how RemoteService, in progressing
its entrepreneurial initiative separated core (secure and
reliable communication platform) from context (smart
glass as tool to carry out communication), only to discover
additional opportunities for using core technology.
We initially focused on technology to provide video
conferencing with augmented reality on smart glasses, […] but then discovered what customers really
wanted. And they didn’t want a video conferencing
tool for smart glass, but a communication platform
and possibility to have their entire servicing workflows in one platform. And additional features, such
as documentation and knowledge capture, are only
possible because of the communication services. Our
business was always about the exchange of information, be it in the form of video conferences or
other. But we have always taken additional aspects
into account to create a more coherent workflow. And
our target market is mechanical and plant engineering. This includes almost every industrial sector.
We have a use case wherever complex devices need
to be maintained, from medical scales to sensory
applications. And the core features remain the same.
We currently individualize the topics of documentation, i.e., according to which logic cases are stored
and filtered. (CEO RemoteService)
Forking allowed the digital ventures to pursue additional
innovation trajectories, while minimizing the effort
required to do so. The quick reenactment of contextspecific features enabled the ventures to speed up their
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launch and leverage existing knowledge to reduce and cope
with uncertainty.
EventPromo is another case in point: initially, EventPromo focused on promoting events (e.g., concerts, festival, and sports events), to boost conversion, ticket sales,
and reach by engaging ambassadors (so called ‘nano
influencers’) who actively promoted an event by performing pre-defined promoting activities (e.g., share a post on
Facebook or Snapchat). However, realizing that mechanisms for promoting events through ambassadors likewise
applied to consumer goods and other services as well,
EventPromo relaunched their offering under a new name,
marketing it as a digital solution for promoting all sorts of
artifacts (e.g., shoes, consumer products), along with context-specific bundles of additional functionality. For
instance, promotion of events involved integrating with
ticketing providers’ IT systems, while promoting consumer
products required integration of shop systems. Collectively,
these activities allowed digital ventures to pursue additional innovation trajectories in a lean way while minimizing associated risk and costs and avoiding pitfalls.
The other activity we unearthed from the data that
manifested porting was selected interfacing, which captures how digital ventures opened their core digital technology, such that third parties could connect and employ
the functionality for their own purposes.1 Central to this
was digital ventures’ ability to bundle digital technology
functionality (e.g., software features) into modularized
subsets that were made available via APIs. Selected
interfacing allowed digital ventures to establish themselves
as a ‘‘go-to provider’’ for a particular service. Further,
selected interfacing presented a means for ventures to
defend against copy-cats imitating their business model.
For instance, ContentBlock bundled its core functionality, namely blocking ads, by providing dedicated build
tools that third parties could use to produce builds of the
content blocking solution. Further, ContentBlock actively
promoted this way of accessing its functionality by providing dedicated application programming interfaces and
by signing strategic deals. Reflecting on the strategic
importance of one such deal, the chairman noted:
Once you install this browser, a dialog box appears
that says, ‘‘You can now block ads with ContentBlock’’. It’s our logo, it’s our trade mark, and the
user only has to click yes and he’s good. And that is
of course something completely different than
installing an extension. […] To simply click ‘yes’ in a
1

While this is a common tactic for platform providers as well,
selected interfacing does not result in the company becoming a
platform. Our analysis suggests that digital ventures primarily enact
this activity as a means to enter into other adjacent markets without
high resource commitments.
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process that you go through anyway, is of course
much easier. And in this case, [the web browser
developer] approached us and we put together a team
that does just this sort of thing. Because we see it as
strategic growth path: Of course we want to get into
all browsers and of course not every browser has
extensions and then we just have to provide libraries
and processes so that they can simply integrate our
adblocking functionality. (Question: And what prevents them from doing that themselves?) They could
do that. That’s legit. In the end they also know that
it’s not quite as complex and [the browser developer]
could put a lot of resources on it. [But] doing
adblocking properly is also not that easy. Adblocking
isn’t as trivial as it used to be because countermeasures become more complex. [And they] get it for free
from us. We don’t want any money for that. For us, it
means growth. We increase our reach and they get
the feature always perfectly maintained, always
updated libraries, well documented adblocking
libraries, and APIs. What more could you want?
(CEO ContentBlock)
Selected interfacing thus allowed the ventures to progress their venturing efforts and offering, while increasing
reach and improving market position. Yet, selected interfacing varied in scope, ranging from interfacing just a
limited set of selected core features as in the example
above, to interfacing almost the entire offering. For
instance, in addition to the b2c solution TowCar entered
the market with, TowCar later decided to also release a b2b
solution of its digital offering as a white-label solution, that
third parties could adopt, such as car rental and car sharing
providers:
With our b2b version, which we also call white label
solution, we try to win car sharing companies and car
rental companies, as customers. This means that even
if end users call the car sharing company because
their rental car broke down, this gets forwarded to us.
And we approached them saying we grant you access
to our network, we have the system, we could integrate [this feature] into the app or we integrate your
call center, they can just report incidents to us, or
they get a portal or a white label solution. Or an
interface. We work a lot with interfaces, so we have
an API that is very simple. And then they can report
incidents directly from their system with a simple
mouse click. (CEO TowCar)
In the case above, interfacing spanned nearly the entire
offering, except for features that were specific to the
original use context (e.g., the auctioning mechanism by
which the matching takes place in b2c contexts). TowCar
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Fig. 3 Emergent model of
continuous post-launch product
development in digital ventures
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Digital Product
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realized the importance of such a move on the route of
becoming a viable organization. One of the co-founders
described the strategic importance of such initiatives as
follows:
We also work with [a major supplier]. They
approached us because they want to enter the
breakdown service market. And they were looking for
a network and thought: They could set up a network
themselves or build on an existing network. And we
already had a network. They said: Okay, we’ll take
TowCar. And they use it for eCalls, which will be
mandatory for new cars next year. And there will be a
button in your car that connects you to the next
support center. […] And they just thought: ‘We’re
already in the car, with the eCall and the concierge
service. We could also do breakdown service.’ That
was their idea and they looked for a network. […]
And they are now trying to diffuse our network, our
technology, to car manufacturers, to fleet customers,
etc. (CEO TowCar)

5 Emergent Theoretical Model
Our empirical analysis uncovered three specific design
mechanisms through which digital ventures continuously
develop their digital offerings post-launch. Figure 3 presents our emergent theoretical model that captures these
design mechanisms together with the mutually constituent
relationships between them. This is important because our
analysis of the temporal-logical relationships between the
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mechanisms indicates that they do not occur in isolation;
they interact with and constitute one another.
First, the deploying complementary digital objects
mechanism was key for architectural amplification to
occur, as the deployment of digital objects to integrate their
market offering into the environment allowed the ventures
to develop deep insights about user habits and needs,
thereby initiating change in the market offerings’ digital
architecture. Consider how ScanFeet adjusted its scanning
algorithm to also allow for inputs from new sensor technologies such as the iPhone X camera. Further, the
deploying complementary digital objects mechanism supplements porting in that digital ventures more readily
identify niches to tap with their offerings. An example is
EventPromo, whose integrations with social media tools
allowed them to better understand how to promote all sorts
of goods and service.
Second, the architectural amplification mechanism is
essential for the further development of digital ventures’
market offering. On one hand, architectural amplification,
in the form of retrospective modularization, generates
options for the venture to address emergent demands and
new use contexts through porting. Only by having a
modular and well-maintained digital architecture, can
digital ventures isolate core technology and deploy it to
new contexts. ScanFeet, as an example, was suffering from
a fragile digital architecture, which needed to be refactored
prior to developing a white-label solution. On the other
hand, architectural amplification also complements the
deployment of digital objects in that digital ventures can
readily connect to the various resources they draw on to
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instill their offerings into user workflows. TowCar, for
example could simplify the onboarding process for towing
services by clearly demarcating the areas in which it would
be active, thanks to the development of a graph-based
matching algorithm.
Third, porting interacts with other mechanisms in two
important ways. First, in order to port, digital ventures
require a digital architecture that supports such design acts
rather than prevents them. For instance, monolithic digital
architectures hamper their deployment to new use contexts.
Consider how ContentBlock switched to a micro-servicebased architecture prior to pursuing new collaborations
with browser developers. Second, as porting allows digital
ventures to enter new industries, it enables the deployment
of further digital objects to accommodate new use contexts,
for example in the form of dedicated APIs for specific
industry segments. RemoteService, for instance, added
augmented reality features as it began support the servicing
of particularly large machines.

6 Discussion
Our study contributes to the blossoming discourse on
digital entrepreneurship (Berger et al. 2019; Von Briel
et al. 2021; Nambisan 2017; Steininger 2019) by developing three new empirically grounded theoretical mechanisms (deploying complementary digital objects,
architectural amplification, and porting) that explain how
digital ventures work on their products ‘‘on the ground’’,
and which are specific to the post-launch phase of the
entrepreneurial journey, yet distinct from digital innovation
activities prevalent in preceding (Marion et al. 2012, 2015)
or succeeding (Huang et al. 2017) entrepreneurial stages.
While some aspects of our analysis also feature in other
studies, such as the ability to cater core digital technology
to new use cases (Antonopoulou et al. 2016; Huang et al.
2021), how the mechanisms come together and collectively
allow digital ventures to continuously evolve their products
substantially advances our understanding of the role of
digital technologies for entrepreneurial processes and outcomes and how they shape entrepreneurial pursuits (Autio
et al. 2018; Nambisan 2017). Our multiple case study leads
us to conclude that digital ventures skillfully advance their
entrepreneurial agenda after they launched a digital offering by deliberately leveraging the unique capacity for
change inherent in digital technology. Below we focus on
three implications in particular that flow from our findings
and explanation: digital artifacts and their evolution, continuous product design in digital ventures, and trajectories
of digital entrepreneurship.
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6.1 Digital Artifacts and their Evolution
Our study draws attention to digital offerings as a new unit
of analysis, which responds to calls in the entrepreneurship
literature for stronger emphasis on the role of artifacts
(Berglund et al. 2020; Dimov 2016). An important implication that follows from this focus concerns how digital
technology traits come into being. While much research
has been devoted to theorizing about the consequences that
digital technology’s malleability, openness, and re-programmability hold for product and service designs (Yoo
et al. 2010) as well as value creation and capture (Nambisan 2017; Parker et al. 2017), little research has looked
into how these traits come about. Our case analysis suggests that these traits play a crucial role in the further
development of digital ventures (e.g., think of the selected
interfacing activity), yet the ventures’ digital offerings
often did not exhibit these traits when launched. To illustrate this point, recall how ScanFeet spent substantial time
on refactoring their digital architecture to ensure their
offering was malleable, generative, and open.
Our research also suggests that digital ventures need to
be mindful in how they construct their digital offerings, as
the changeable design of their properties influences their
long-term prosperity. As our study revealed, these properties should not be taken for granted. They require
deliberate design, for example by employing contemporary
digital architecture design principles (e.g., micro service
architectures). Existing research refers to such designs as
modular layered architectures (Yoo et al. 2010). Our study
thus points to a delicate tension for digital ventures: While
designing modular and flexible nearly-decomposable
(Baldwin and Clark 2000; Simon 1996) digital artifacts is
key for digital ventures’ future development, the time and
cost associated with designing such layered modular
architectures are higher compared to the quick-and-dirty
approach, that digital ventures often follow in their early
days, as they seek to quickly enact and validate a business
idea (Woodard et al. 2013). As such, the technical debt that
ventures accumulate in their early days may hamper their
future development as they evolve. A prominent example is
MySpace, whose simplistic digital architecture limited its
ability to sustain growth and respond to changing environments, which ultimately resulted in its failure. Future
research should thus look more closely at the processes by
which these traits come about, and explore the contingencies of design decisions, and how digital ventures can
address the trade-off between short-term demands of being
quick and long-term viability.
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6.2 From New to Continuous Product Development
in Digital Ventures
Past research has characterized product and service innovation as well-bounded phenomena with discrete boundaries (Nambisan 2003, 2013; Takeuch and Nonaka 1986).
With our study, we show that digital ventures continue to
develop their products after they have been introduced to
the market to ensure they are and remain useful, and thus
create value for customers (Autio et al. 2018; Autio and
Thomas 2020). The mechanisms we present in this paper
provide an important first step towards developing theoretical language that can be used to capture the implications of the inherently fluid and porous boundaries of
digital products and services for their continuous development (Garud et al. 2008) or for organizational identity
(Wessel et al. 2021). Importantly, we find that digital
ventures deliberately draw on their product’s malleability
and generativity to entertain relationships with a diverse set
of social (e.g., market incumbents) and technological
agents (e.g., third-party products), to enhance the value
they generate for users (Huang et al. 2017). Our study thus
acknowledges that digital ventures do not operate in a
vacuum; creating value in a digital world is increasingly
dispersed across multiple actors with diverse goals. An
important quest for future research is thus to explore how
value creation is organized and orchestrated in a digital
world, to understand new opportunities that the diffusion of
digital technologies into entrepreneurship brings about for
the continuous development of new products.
6.3 Appreciating the True Trajectories of Digital
Ventures
A core interest of digital entrepreneurship research is rapid
growth (Huang et al. 2017; Tumbas et al. 2017a). But few
studies have investigated how digital ventures’ market
offerings evolve, despite the purported fusion of processes
and outcomes (Nambisan 2017; Nambisan et al. 2017). Yet
there is growing interest in understanding how digital
ventures leverage digital technology to pursue new entrepreneurial efforts, for instance by repurposing core digital
technology (Huang et al. 2021). What is unique about
digital ventures is their ability to do so at comparably low
costs because digital technology is malleable and has close
to zero costs of reproduction (Huang et al. 2021; Nambisan
2017).
While our study takes a focus on the time after market
launch, our findings complement this stream of research by
putting into focus the products that digital ventures develop
and the actions that ventures pursue on the group when
doing so. The mechanisms we identified would perhaps
differ, had we focused on another venturing stage. This
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leads us to believe that we need a more nuanced understanding digital entrepreneurship, one in which context
(Nambisan 2017; Zahra and Wright 2011) features more
prominently. How digital ventures appropriate digital
technology is likely to evolve along with the venture. For
instance, concepts like data driven operation and swift
transformation, which are associated with the rapid growth
of digital ventures (Huang et al. 2017, 2021), did not feature strongly in our empirical data. We conjecture that one
of the reasons is the focus we took in our study: data driven
operation requires the existence of large volumes of data,
which is not necessarily available to digital ventures upon
the launch of their offerings; digital trace data streams
oftentimes are generated through later iterations of the
digital products where more emphasis is placed on data
capturing (e.g., through more sophisticated sensor technology) or when more usage data is accrued through a
much larger user base. For example, RemoteService as
well as ScanFeet were actively seeking to accumulate data
for the further development of their ventures, yet this
proved to be difficult for numerous reasons, including a
small user base. In all, we believe that future research
should look more closely at the way in which digital
technology’s role evolves along with the ventures that
employ them.
6.4 Practical Implications
Our study also has implications for practitioners. First, it
highlights that digital ventures do not exist in a vacuum.
While digital technology affords potentially open-ended
and unbounded possibilities for developing innovative
products, those products have to be situated within prevalent industry conditions. Digital ventures need to be aware
of potential dependencies, such as when relying on thirdparty APIs, and revise initial assumptions about their customers’ digital literacy, for instance in case they enter
largely non-digital industries, to ensure that their products
are fit to survive in these contexts.
Second, digital ventures, with every major change to
their products, also need to balance how much technical
debt they accumulate. While there are some known benefits
of acquiring a certain level of technical debt, such as
reduced development time, a chaotic product architecture
(think ScanFeet) may severely hamper a digital venture’s
ability to launch new functionality and/or adapt the product
to new use cases. Ultimately, the accumulation of technical
debt may thus negatively affect a digital venture’s future
prospects.
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6.5 Limitations

•

There are several limitations to our study. Foremost, typical limitations related to inductive research and the reliance
on retrospective data apply to our work. For example, other
research teams could collect different data, pursue different
analysis strategies, or interpret the data differently from us.
We attempted to report on our procedures, data and
abstraction in the most transparent way possible but other
interpretations and analyses remain possible.
As is common, our main source of data were interviews,
some of which were retrospective. This strategy could be
prone to interviewee bias, recency bias, and selection bias,
which could impact the accuracy of our data. By using a
variety of data sources (archival documents and interviews)
and focusing on key events that were publicly traceable, we
hope to mitigate potential bias. Future research could
benefit from relying on real-time data to chronicle product
development post launch (e.g., through commits on software development repositories), to corroborate our
findings.
Finally, our sampling strategy focused only on ‘successful’ cases. As such, we are unable to make any statements about the effectiveness and expedience of the
mechanisms we identified for ensuring a digital venture’s
long-term prosperity. Future research may investigate if the
behaviors of unsuccessful digital ventures differ from those
identified in this study.

•

Appendix: Interview Protocol

•
•
•
•
(2)
•
•

•
•

(3)

Who were the founders? What training do the team
members have?
Who else was involved in founding the company? How
did the financing take place?
What kind of product/service does your startup offer?
How does the product/service offered today work? How
is the product/service structured? IT components?
What is the company’s business model? What is the
central value proposition?
Who are the target customers?
Interviewee background
What is your role in the startup? What are your tasks?
Has your role changed over time? If so, why?
What points of contact do you have with digital
technologies?
What do you understand by digital technologies?
How and for what purpose do you personally use digital
technologies in your professional environment?
How has the product changed over time?
Development of the product
•
•
•

•

Introduction
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

(5)

Welcome and thank you very much for the time
Project description: A scientific study of the role of
digital technologies in startups
Aim of the interview: Understand how your startup
has evolved and what role digital technologies have
played and your perspective on digital technologies.
Confidentiality: If possible, the interview will be
recorded for transcription and analysis. All content
will be kept confidential, recordings and transcriptions will be anonymized and not shared.
Do you have any questions before we start?

Main Part
(1)
•
•

Background and context
Could you please describe your startup?
What is the startup called and what does it do? Why
was the company founded?
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•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Could you describe your product in as much
detail as possible and how you developed it?
What did the idea look like at the beginning, how
did it change? Where did the idea come from?
Were there situations where several ideas were
pursued at the same time? If so, why? What were
these ideas?
Could you describe, in as much detail as
possible, how your product has changed since it
was first launched and how you have used digital
technologies in this process?
How has the development path of the product
changed over time?
What has caused these changes? Why has the
change occurred?
What was the situation before and after the
change? What did the product look like and how
did it change over time?
Which, and how were digital technologies used
before and after the change?
What problems and challenges arose during the
development of your company?
What did you do to counter the problems?
How did you use digital technologies to counter
the problems?

Were there any other events that had a significant impact
on the company’s development? Change/Changes?
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Miscellaneous
•
•
•

Did we forget something you’d like to say?
Are there any other events or circumstances worth
mentioning?
Who else could we talk to, to learn more, and can you
help us get in touch?
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